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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s the postal sector is undergoing substantial changes, basically as a result of its 
liberalisation, triggered and sustained by market forces, technology, as well as by the European 
Commission and its deregulation policies. Overall, the historical postal operators have successfully 
adapted to these changes by modernising their structures and their processes, by diversifying, and by 
internationalising. 
This article outlines the historic developments which shaped today’s postal market in Europe and 
gives answers to the question why its incumbent operators compete in their specific manner. We will 
start by describing the current state of the postal industry today and its historical development up to 
now. Here, we will especially look at the forces which have been triggering the transformation of the 
industry during the 1980s and 1990s, in particular the deregulation policies pursued by the European 
Union and national governments in Europe and elsewhere. Besides such political drivers, we will also 
look at market forces that have been unleashed in the industry.  
Based on this we conduct a competitive analysis of the European incumbent postal operators. In doing 
so, the paper will build on the theoretical framework of Michael Porter’s industry and competitive 
analysis: The objective of the latter is to develop a strategy profile of a competitor which provides 
information about the likely success of the current strategy and probable responses to the strategic 
moves of its competitors, as well as to changes within the industry. Porter lists four diagnostic 
components: future goals, current strategy, assumptions and capabilities (strengths and weaknesses).  
The conlusions from this competitive analysis will bring up four factors which were crucial in the 
development of competition in the industry. They determine what kind of strategies an operator has at 
its disposal and how he will be able to act in an ever more competitive market: (1) Asymmetric Market 
Development, (2) Type of Ownership, (3) Size of Home Market, and (4) Degree of Diversification. 
Together, these four factors significantly determine how a historical postal operator will be able to 
react to the above identified trends, and how the competitive postal landscape of the future will look 
like. 
In the last chapter we draw the competitive landscape, again following the framework of Porter, by 
giving an overview about to be expected offensive moves or the defensive capabilities of the European 
incumbents. 
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2. TRENDS AND STRATEGIC DRIVERS IN THE POSTAL INDUSTRY 
There is a broad consensus that the postal sector worldwide has entered a period of fundamental 
change. “The environment of the postal industry continues to be dominated by globalization, 
liberalization, competition, technological change, outsourcing and other change drivers” (UPU, 2002: 
25). From a competitive point of view, the key drivers which have influenced and keep influencing the 
industry are regulatory and institutional developments, quickly changing shape of the industry and its 
markets and new technologies. “Unleashed by the pincer movement of technical innovations and 
market liberalisation the 1990s have seen dramatic reorganisation efforts at many large postal 
operators worldwide. These efforts mainly aiming at a diversification and internationalisation of the 
business were strongly spurred by a stagnation in the demand of the incumbent domestic mail and 
parcel segment, as well as by an increasing competition” (Dörrenbächer, 2004: 1). As it is not the aim 
of this article to discuss the trends and strategic drivers, the following short overview just provides the 
common frame for the competitive analyis afterwards. It bases on broadly accepted facts and opinions 
of experts in this field. 
2.1 Regulatory and Institutional Developments 
Political changes were (and continue to be) the major environmental pressure point in the last decades. 
While globalisation and market forces do play a critical role in the evolving postal sector, institutional 
policies of liberalisation has been the most significant driver of change. More precisely, the European 
Union has been at the forefront of liberalisation and subsequent re-regulation of the postal sector, and 
its influence extends far beyond Europe. Most authors start their analysis in 1992, when the Green 
Book was published by the European Commission. From a political point of view this Green Book 
which defines in essence the future construction of the postal sector and market in Europe formed the 
foundation for all subsequent developments in this industry. The Postal Directive 97/67/EC was the 
concretisation on the legal level by defining a minimal Universal Service, limiting the letter 
monopolies to 350 grams and implementing independent national regulators. With the Directive 
2002/39/EC a further cut in the letters monopoly to 100 grams was made by January 2003. Both 
Directives aim for a gradual and controlled market opening of the postal sector throughout the EU and 
were milestones on the way to the full liberalisation of the European postal market by 2006 when all 
postal services will be open to competition. The allowed market competition should result in lower 
costs of resources used to deliver services, lower market prices, higher quality of services and thus an 
increase in overall value created (see Strikwerda/Rijnders, 2004; others). 
The consequences are multifaceted: Various private postal operators (so called Competing Postal 
Operators, CPO) are now offering multiple services, especially for parcels but also for business letters 
(B2X, businesses as sender). Nevertheless, all incumbents have maintained dominance in the home 
market but the focus changed from competition in national markets to a competition for the European 
market (see Strikwerda/Rijnders, 2004): The market opening enabled the larger incumbents to enter 
other national markets and to compete there with the incumbent operator, such as the German Post did 
with its subsidiary DHL or the French Post with its subsidiary DPD. Last but not least also several 
logistics divisions of large companies are now offering their services and products to business 
customers. One of the most successful examples is the Hermes Logistik Gruppe, the subsidiary of Otto 
Versand in Germany, which today offers a full range of parcel and letter services in the X2C segment 
(private households as recipients). 
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Another dynamic could be observed in the last decade, the trend towards corporatisation: More and 
more European governments started to incorporate the incumbent operator, to sell shares at the stock 
exchange and therefore to reduce the state-controlled part to a minimum. The aim is to raise capital for 
further investments as well as to give the management the utmost flexibility to act on the liberalised 
market. Within this development, some incumbents, such as the German and the Dutch Post, began to 
buy shares of other incumbents in order to ensure their stake in the major letter markets throughout 
Europe. 
The ongoing corporatisation and the sale of shares to investors has automatically led to a quest for 
financial performance as incumbents are no longer controlled by the government but also by both 
institutional and private shareholders who stipulate a maximisation of their investment. The executives 
of the incumbent therefore do no longer only have to provide a reliable service public but do have to 
bear in mind the financial demands of the shareholder. Satisfying these different requirements is a 
difficult task which raises many problems, for example by taking investment decisions which are 
necessary to hold up the required universal service but which will not pay off the financial investment 
(or vice versa). As the privatisation proceeds, the boundaries between public and private operators will 
become blurred as both serve the same markets with comparable products and both are governed by 
the same managerial principals. This will produce highly competitive strategic groups where the 
distinctive feature is not the national versus private ownership but the range of services and the 
geographical reach. 
2.2 Industry & Market Developments 
The total EU letter market is estimated to have been about EUR 49 billion in 2000 and EUR 52 billion 
in 2002. The annual growth rate has been about 3.5%, but a significant slowdown to 0.5 in 2003 or 
even decrease in the near future is expected. Within this market, the six largest Universal Service 
Providers (USP) have together more than 75% market share. The total revenues earned in EU parcel 
and express markets are estimated to amount to EUR 33 billion in 2000 and EUR 36 billion in 2001 
(see Campbell, 2004: 26ff.). In contrast to the letter market, this market is more fragmented with many 
small and medium enterprises offering local CEP services and the five largest operators accounting for 
approximately 52% market share. Postal services today position themselves at the crossroads of three 
different markets: Communication market (e.g. letters), advertising market (e.g direct mail) and 
transportation/logistics market (e.g. parcels). All of them are important for the economic development 
and welfare and are generally open to competition. This fact forces incumbents to battle at different 
fronts at the same time. 
Globalisation is still one of the major pressure points on postal operators. Customers are increasingly 
making production, location, marketing and sourcing decisions on an international level and are 
looking for pan-European or international “end-to-end” services and solutions. The postal markets 
have therefore evolved from a national to a regional, European level with the top operators such as 
Deutsche Post World Net (DPWN) and TNT competing on an international level. With operational 
networks (not own infrastructure, but alliances and partnerships) expanding in scale and reach, postal 
operators have to grow together with their customers. Parallel to the globalisation of the express and 
the parcel markets, new entrants have emerged – e.g., Fedex, DHL, TNT, UPS and others more – 
some of which have been absorbed again by some of the historical operators. But one must also 
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mention here numerous entrants on the national, sub-national and even local parcels and express 
markets, who operate in particular geographical areas or with particular clients. 
Customers, particularly business customers who account for 82% of the mail (with 39% going to other 
business recipients and 43% to households; UPU, 2002: 26) are becoming increasingly demanding: 
They want faster, more reliable postal services, more choice of product (including more sophisticated 
products, such as tracking) and competitive prices which meet their individual requirements. "The 
trend in demand is for postal and logistics services to be more standardised, available from a single 
buying point, across geographical areas and transport modes, for all consignment weights and types, in 
a range of time-definite options" (International Post Corporation, 2004: 16) 
As far as the demand side is concerned, one can observe different tendencies. “Threats are ongoing, 
and they take the form of obsolescence and reduced demand for letters through substitution” (UPU, 
2002: 26). The most brought up trend is the e-substitution, the thread of substitution of the letter as the 
traditional way of written communication by electronic ways such as e-mail. Although worries about 
future growth of the letter volume are not new, e-substitution has contributed substantially to the 
slowdown. These effects were analysed in several studies1 and the decline in growth was measured: 
While the growth rate between 1995 and 2000 in Western Europe was 2.6% per year, it was only 0.5% 
in the years 2002 and 2003. Astonishingly, the stimulant impact of economic growth on the growth of 
mail volume is declining and a correlation can no longer be established: According to IPC 
(International Post Corporation, 2003: 16), forecasting mail volumes is nowadays extremely difficult 
as the traditional variables (gross national product, personal consumption, and consumer prices 
indexes) for predicting longer-term trends are no longer correlated with the performance of postal 
operators. Since 1998 the letter post has grown at only half of the rate of real GDP, a discrepancy that 
has widened sharply as letter post volumes have remained flat since 2000. 
2.3 New Technologies2 
New technologies are an important source of innovation and a major growth driver enabling postal 
operator to develop high-performing services and products in response to a constantly changing 
environment. One must name especially the information and communication technologies (ICT) which 
act simultaneously on a product and on a process/production level. Of particular interest here is the 
way the historical operators have made use of the ICTs when innovating: let us mention the tracking 
and tracing technologies, as well as other investments into improving speed and quality of the postal 
service, such as for example high tech sorting centres. Indeed, thanks to the ICTs the historical postal 
operators have managed to simultaneously achieve several goals, namely efficiency gains in the 
production process, speed and faster delivery times as well as significant quality improvements. New 
technologies have, as a consequence, also revolutionised bulk mail, generated hybrid products 
(computerised mass mailings), and made possible new services such as tracking and tracing. Rather 
than simply transporting letters and parcels from A to B, the ICTs do indeed offer significant new 
possibilities to add value to such transport, and, by doing so, to help the historical postal operators 
become much smarter, as well as more customer focused. Innovations in technology are also used by 
                                                     
1  See International Post Corporation (2004: 18ff.), Campbell (2004: 133ff.) 
2  For further information on this topic see: Finger/Alyanak/Rossel (2005) 
4 
postal operators to compensate the negative effects of e-substitution by offering multiple web services 
such as e-banking, mail-accounts, and virtual document services.  
Overall, the ICTs increase the availability of information to customers and thus reduce the information 
stronghold that the enterprise holds over the business. As a result, the customers are being empowered 
and can somewhat take control over the products and services. Consequently, this will increase 
transparency in the markets and enable the customers to make qualified decisions. One can expect 
significant competition and innovation from this evolution, and only companies with the technical and 
organisational cability to be transparent to their customers will gain.  
2.4 Incumbents’ Responses 
These manifold trends and strategic drivers in regulation, market development and technology led to a 
variety of changes in the competitive behaviour. The Universal Postal Union identified the following 
main strategies (UPU, 2002: 33ff.): 
 
(1) Efficiency improvement / Rises in productivity 
(2) Modernisation of retail outlets / Improving image / Opening new opportunities 
(3) Quality of services 
(4) Diversification 
(5) Globalisation 
(6) Acquisitions 
(7) Alliances 
Strategy (1) concerns a technological aspect of postal logistics, while strategies (2) and (3) primarly 
address marketing and sales topics. The other strategies correspond with the three main 
“reorganisation dimensions” postulated by Dörrenbächer (2003: 11ff.): Diversification (4), 
Internationalisation (5), and Integration (6, 7). As those three dimensions are of strategic relevance, we 
will examine them in the following. 
2.5 Diversification 
For obvious reasons it is not attractive to reinvest free cash flows from the declining mail business in 
the existing activities as it would not provide a sound basis for a long-term strategy. The moves 
(mainly of the larger) incumbents therefore aim at reducing the dependence on the declining mail 
market by expanding into higher-growth, higher-profitability, but more competitive business areas. 
Most of the responses to the strategic drivers and changes in the competitive behaviour of the 
incumbents can therefore be subsumed under the mantle of diversification. It is therefore fair to 
conclude that diversification is a commonly found answer to the strategic drivers which challenge the 
postal industry.  
2.6 Internationalisation / Globalisation 
The general trend in all industries to corporate internationalisation in general has started in the 1950s, 
both in quality and quantity. “This is mainly due to overall structural changes such as political 
liberalisation, the decrease of transportation and communication costs as well as a growing 
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homogenisation of products and services across borders” (Dörrenbächer, 2004: 12). The postal 
business has always been an international business with incumbents delivering mail to another 
country, but only to one specific geographical point where another incumbent had to take over. This 
fact alone does certainly not make an industry international. However, with the liberalisation as an 
enabler and the homogenisation of the offering as a driver on the demand side, these were also the 
reasons for the internationalisation of postal operators. The pressure on postal operators to use the 
newest technology is a further aspect of internationalisation as the infrastructure should be pan-
European to achieve lowest average costs. Through diversification and the widening of the portfolios 
incumbents can optimise network infrastructures, cost structures and therefore realise economies of 
scale. 
One could argue that internationalisation is a driver itself and not a competitive reaction. However, 
incumbents would not have expansed internationally out of nothing as they were operating as national 
operators for centuries and basically set up to serve the confined home market. The 
internationalisation of the business customers, their need for one-stop shopping solutions, or the 
increase in cross-border mail traffic created a new necessity for internationally operating companies. A 
(theoretical) intrinsic motivation for an internationalisation could be a fast growth and/or a higher 
profitability of a foreign market. Although the first can currently be observed in China with countless 
companies eager to expand, the behaviour of the European postal competitors is different: Only the 
already widely internationally active DPWN and TNT are developping such new markets to close 
white gaps on their maps. 
To sum up, incument postal operators are today competing on three different levels: The national, the 
regional, and the international level. When talking about the national level we mean the competition in 
a country within its political borders while the regional level concludes all activities from the adjactent 
countries to an area-wide pan-European business.  
2.7 Integration 
For centuries, the postal market acted as a well balanced network with strong incumbents and long-
lived agreements between them. After building up international networks to provide one-stop-
shopping cross-border solutions postal operators do also have to control the whole network and are 
therefore integrating continuously new companies. This consolidation and network creation process is 
progressing along three main axes of vertical integration, horizontal integration, and diagonal 
integration: 
Vertical integration3 is pursued through upward linkages, thus increasing their reach by offering new 
product lines, and through downward linkages by buying courier and express companies, so to be able 
to service customer to the last mile (i.e., the homes of end customers). Obviously, the aim is to create 
an integrated service, by offering the whole management of the supply chain under a single roof. At 
the same time, the economies of scale which are being built up can be used to increase the efficiency 
                                                     
3  We distinguish vertical integration from diversification as follows: Vertical integration remains within the traditional postal value chain 
while diversification seeks new businesses outside the traditional business. There is, however, no exact separation between the two 
terms. 
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of the entire supply chain process by lowering costs for both the operator as well as the (end-) 
customer.  
In terms of horizontal integration, incumbents are buying competitors in other geographical areas, so 
as to expand their global reach and to build up their global network. Initially, large incumbents have 
entered foreign markets which were open for competition and where legal and political hurdles were 
low for non-domestic firms. Therefore, it made sense to enter new markets via an acquisition or the 
setting up of express and parcel businesses. Alliances and minority strategic shareholdings may also 
be part of this strategy to increase the global reach, especially where taking over another firm is not 
opportune due to political or legal reasons. 
Finally, incumbents are teaming up with enterprises from other sectors in order to complement their 
production and marketing strategies. This is especially the case in conjunction with the upcoming 
information technologies that force all postal companies to offer new products and venture into 
unchartered territories that hitherto had been occupied by either media or telecommunications firms. 
For example track and trace services are to be found in this group. The general aim of diagonal 
integration is to allow for cross selling of new products in order to increase the profitability of the 
company on the basis of existing product lines. Just as with vertical integration, extra business can be 
generated by offering the customer a (virtual) one-stop shop. 
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3. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INCUMBENT POSTAL 
OPERATORS 
“Competitive intelligence is a systematic program for gathering and analyzing information about your 
competitors’ activities and general business trends to further your own company’s goals” (Kahaner, 
1997: 16). A company doing competitive analysis wants therefore to anticipate changes in the 
marketplace as well as the possible actions of competitors. Furthermore, new or potential competitors 
should be discovered and learnings from the success and failures of others deducted. In this chapter, 
competitive intelligence about European incumbent postal operators is gathered in order to consolidate 
the facts, assumptions and rumours to a competitive analysis. The objective of this competitive 
analysis is to develop a strategy profile of the respective incumbent, which provides information about 
the likely success of the current strategy and probable responses to the strategic moves of its 
competitors, as well as to changes within the industry.  
Porter (2000b: 48) lists four diagnostic components: future goals, current strategy, assumptions, and 
capabilities (strengths and weaknesses). The traditional analysis starts at the future goals, proceeds to 
the assumptions which in combination leads to the current strategy which can be double-checked with 
the capabilities of the competitor. For obvious reasons, the current strategy and the capabilities (what 
the competitor is doing and can do) can be analysed more easily than its future goals and the 
assumptions held about itself and industry. These latter factors are much harder to observe, although 
they explain what is really driving the company and determine how a competitor will behave in the 
future.  
Those profiles are normally used within a closely defined market and usually developped by a 
competitor to analyse his rivals with whom he is competing directly in the same market every day. For 
this scientific reason, competitive profiles are generated of companies which – although competing in 
the same industry – are not competing in the same (geographical) market. This procedure allows 
comparing different incumbents by common criterias from a neutral viewpoint. 
Putting the four components together allows us to design competitor response profiles (Porter, 2004b: 
67) which give answers about to be expected offensive moves or the defensive capabilities of the 
European incumbents. Offensive moves have to be expected from incumbents which are not satisfied 
with their current position and which have future goals (stated or implied) which make offensive 
moves necessary. Those moves have to be rated about their strenght and seriousness, in other words 
the consequences for the market must be evaluated. The defense capability predicts how the other 
market participants will react on the offensive moves and how vulnerable they are. 
The detailled competitor response profiles are not part of this article as they are work in progress and 
therefore not worked up for this purpose here. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COMPETITOR ANALYSIS 
There are of course several conclusions to be drawn, but the most impressive is the following as 
Strikwerda and Rijnders (2004: 8) summarise it: “The future competitive configuration of the 
European postal market cannot be analyzed at the level of the mail business.” Freedom of action in 
mail business has become rare and most incumbents are simply hoping that the full market 
liberalisation can be delayed as long as possible. Successful strategies about how to maintain market 
shares do not exist and solutions to finance the Universal Service Obligation (USO) have to be 
searched elsewhere. 
4.1 Crucial Factors Shaping the Competition 
The very basic reason for carrying out a competitive analysis is the fact that different competitive 
patterns can be observed and the postal operators do not work uniformly across Europe. Putting this as 
an axiom, the focus is laid on the factors which were crucial in the development of competition in the 
industry: 
 
(1) Asymmetric Market Development 
(2) Type of Ownership 
(3) Size of Home Market 
(4) Degree of Diversification 
Together, these four factors significantly determine how a historical postal operator was able to react 
to the above identified trends, and how the competitive postal landscape of the future will look like. 
One would probably expect to find globalisation or internationalisation among these factors, but the 
competitive analysis has pinpointed that this trend or the degree of its achievement do not necessarly 
influence the competitive behaviour of any incumbent. The authors expect that in the near future the 
factor “alliances/networks” will also become a crucial factor. We will later see that most incumbents 
are not competitive enough to succeed in a changing market environment without a strong alliance or 
network. 
4.2 Asymmetric Market Development 
Like in all other liberalising industries, market development is, at least in the beginning of the process, 
relatively uneven and differs from country to country. The uneven market development was (and still 
is) supported by the phenomenon of “asymmetric liberalisation” (Strikwerda/Rijnders, 2004: 2). Most 
economic theories assume that the process of liberalisation is symmetric and synchronous, that the 
benefits are distributed evenly and that each economy has sufficient comparable advantages. Although 
the Postal Directive is mandatory for the EU member countries, it is realised in a very heterogeneous 
manner with different paces and most of the non-member countries are following autonomously but 
only partially and with substantial differences. This market disequilibrium creates opportunities for 
early moving incumbents from more protected markets to compete for more open markets while the 
opposite is not possible wherefore the state of liberalisation in the home market has to be contemplated 
as a crucial asset. 
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On the other side, the asymmetric market development also puts pressure on incumbents with further 
liberalised home markets: With competition increasing and monopoly profits diminishing fast, they 
are forced to seek new sources of income which can be found only in new markets, either through a 
geographical expansion or through diversification. So they are generally trying to enter other 
liberalised postal markets abroad. As obvious end game, incumbents in more liberalised markets are 
competing in countries of incumbents whose markets are further liberalised as well. 
One would expect to discover many incumbents with a strictly protected home market (or otherwise 
low competition) and the following secured steady cash flow which go global and enter aggressively 
new markets. This type of incumbent should be able to act from a comfortable starting point as it does 
not have to worry about the home market and has enough resources to act independently. However, 
this trend can definitively not be observed in the European postal market. Rather, in countries with a 
barely liberalised market incumbents have not managed to become full scale global operators whereas 
the highly liberalised market of the Netherlands has generated a global player such as TNT. Only a 
few exceptions can be named which match this profile: Swiss Post has one of the most protected home 
markets but is one of the major international players for cross-border mail. The same applies to 
Austrian Post which has not yet be harassed too much by other operators but is now expanding in the 
Eastern-Europe markets (e.g. Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia). No serious signs of a full market 
liberalisation can be seen in France why competition in this market also has to be considered weak. 
Some level of competition therefore (in conjunction with a large enough home market and easy access 
to capital from the financial markets) seems to be necessary to entice an incumbent into seeking to 
play a global role. 
Those incumbents with more protected markets are in most cases also not active in foreign markets. 
The reason can be that they still earn good money from the monopoly and presently feel no need for 
an increased competitive behaviour. As they can not yet be attacked by other operators (or only in a 
few businesses), they are not urged to engage in any competition and are skimming their home 
markets.  
 
Figure 1: Competitive Environment of Selected Incumbents (schematically). 
The map of the competitive environment (Figure 1) shows these facts schematically: The more 
competition in the home market, the more competitive behaviour in target markets can be observed. 
Unsurprisingly, there are almost no operators which could be described as “moderately competitive”. 
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The market is split in a highly competitive group consisting of DWPN, TNT, Royal Mail and LaPoste 
(commonly referred to as “The Big Four”, see chapter 5.1) and a barely competitive group with the 
remaining incumbents. Barely competitive in this connection does not mean that these incumbents are 
not able to compete with other postal operators, but that they are in arrears with getting fit for the next 
level of competition, especially in comparison with the Big Four and the major private operators. 
Recapitulating can be stated that therefore the opening of the home market and the increasing 
competition in it is conducing to the competitive behaviour in external markets. 
This map only displays the relative degree of competition and does not make any statements about 
absolute market sizes/shares or the success of the corresponding strategy. In other terms, it classifies 
incumbents on an axis how competition has to be rated in relation to the market size/share. 
4.3 Type of Ownership 
Almost the same considerations can be made when regarding the type of ownership: TNT and DPWN 
are both publicly listed at stock exchanges and their governments are constantly reducing the share 
held by the state. Not surprisingly, they are the most competitive incumbent postal op-erators in the 
world, facing high competition in the home market and acting competitive in target markets. Letting 
the incumbents into private ownership seems therefore to be a strategic move by which a government 
can increase the competitive ability of their postal organisation: The ongoing corporatisation and the 
sale of shares to investors automatically leads to a quest for financial performance as institutional and 
private shareholders stipulate a maximisation of their investment. The executives of the incumbent 
therefore do no longer only have to provide a reliable service public but do have to bear in mind the 
financial demands of the shareholder. Furthermore, they have relatively easy access to capital. Vice 
versa, the governmental ownership can impose constraints on the adoption of the most cost effective 
or profit maximising strategy. The policital control and resistance can prevent incumbents from 
investing in private companies or entering into alliances. Other restrictions are for example the raise of 
money, the undertaking of investments or the reducing of staff levels (see Nera, 2004: 39). Over 
decades, Royal Mail was not permitted to buy shares of companies. Joint ventures and alliances were 
limited by a maximum amount. It was only with the introduction of the Postal Services Act in 2000 
when the market was partly liberalised that these restrictions were abolished. 
Ownership, together with the broader strategic attitude of governments vis-à-vis their operators does 
therefore significantly influence the strategic capability of a historical operator. At the time of writing, 
several countries have plans to partially or totally privatise their incumbents, which would free them 
from many of the constraints above: The German government has sold its remaining shares of 
Deutsche Post AG. Denmark sold 25% of its incumbent’s shares and Austria (evaluating an IPO for 
2006), Greece (planning to sell 25% of Hellenic Post), Portugal (planning a 30% partial privatisation 
of CTT Correios), Romania (selling 25%), Hungary, and also Slovakia are seeking for partners. The 
Dutch government further reduced its shares in TNT to 10%. On the contrary the British government 
has just denyed to have plans for a corporisation of Royal Mail. 
4.4 Size of Home Market 
The third factor corresponds basically with the first two: “…it can be argued that the incumbents with 
large home markets naturally exert a higher competitive pressure on incumbents with smaller home 
11 
markets.” (Strikwerda/Rijinders, 2004: 11). A large home (mainly letter) market (such as Germany or 
France) means automatically a better starting point for an incumbent. As they all started with an 
absolute monopoly, incumbents in large markets could build up a larger and highly connected 
infrastructure which provides them higher economies of scale. This asset enables them to enter new 
markets with a wider revenue basis and to achieve earlier the required cost-covering volumes (see 
Manner-Romberg, 2003: 18). If for example DPWN wants to enter the Swiss mail market, it can use 
parts of its infrastructure in the home market to supply the Swiss market and would not be forced to 
build up a whole new infrastructure. For an incumbent, like the Austrian Post, in return, would be 
exactly this step necessary as its infrastructure is geared to a small home market and can not be used 
for additional volumes generated in new markets. 
Likewise related to the home market is the share of an incumbent in it: As each and every European 
incumbent has maintained at an average a dominant share of 95% in the home market (see Campbell, 
2004: 94ff.), the importance of the size of the home market becomes obvious. In 2004, DPWN still 
holds a comfortable 92.2% market share (2003: 96%) in the German letter market which generated the 
necessary cash flow to finance the massive expansion course. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
respective market size and the incumbent’s share: 
Table 1: letter post market sizes and incumbent shares in 2003 (www.upu.int / Campbell, 2004: 94). 
Country Market Size4 Incumbent Share 
Germany 20’840 96.0% 
Great Britain 20’749 99.7% 
Netherlands 5’384 95.0% 
Spain 5’248 90.0% 
Switzerland 2’917 100.0% 
Denmark 1’153 98.0% 
Slovenia 674 98.0% 
The importance of the home market becomes also apparent if the quota between domestic and 
international turnover is compared: In 2000, Royal Mail generated only 7.5% and La Poste 12% of its 
turnovers abroad. Only DPWN (33%) and TNT (75%, due to the small home market) have significant 
relative international turnovers (see Manner-Romberg, 2003: 100). 
4.5 Degree of Diversification 
Keeping in mind that the future of the European postal market can not be analysed on the level of mail 
business, it is obvious that the open, scale-intensive logistics market will drive and shape the future 
postal market. It is such diversification which will allow a historical operator to create competitive 
differences and advantages. Nera (2004: 40) calls these activities the “extended value chain” which 
recognises “that in the case of the majority of postal and express items, a number of activities have 
already taken place before the items are delivered to the postal operator or collected from the 
                                                     
4  Number of letter-post items, domestic service (in millions). 
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customer’s premises”. So the traditional value chain of collection – transport - sorting – transport – 
delivery is extended with inbound and outbound logistics at the beginning. 
The fourth factor deciding the competitive behaviour of an incumbent postal operator is therefore the 
degree of its diversification. As we have seen in chapter 2.5, diversification is beside 
internationalisation and integration the main dimension in which incumbents can develop. However, 
diversification is the one dimension which really creates competitive differences between postal 
operators. Incumbents which have diversified on a large scale compete in multiple, new markets and 
so the strategy is chosen more deliberately. Diversified incumbents invest generally more time and 
money into market research and marketing communication as they have to enter or build up new 
markets what reflects on the competitive behaviour in the traditional postal home market. On the other 
hand, over-diversification may well also be problematic as scarce resources may become spread too 
thin. 
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5. THE COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE 
From a competitive point of view, the European postal market presents itself split in two camps: 
“There is a large group of internationally expanding, pan-European companies to which DPWN, TGP, 
LaPoste, and Royal Mail belong. In the second large group (the defenders) are postal operators whose 
markets are too small or which itself are too small to survive” (Manner-Romberg, 2005: 11). These 
assessments correspond with Finger (2004: 26) who identifies 4 different scenarios for postal 
incumbents: 
 
(1) Global Players, where we look at operators that pursue an expansive growth strategy to become 
globally integrated enterprises offering the fully line of postal products and services from A to Z; 
(2) Specialised Players where smaller postal operators have fully modernised their businesses to 
confront especially the technological challenges but who due to various reasons (political, legal, 
geographic, demographic) have no ambitions to become global operators; 
(3) Defensive Players where postal operators have not yet formulated clear strategies to confront the 
challenges or are due to national constraints (especially domestic political reasons) not able to do 
so; 
(4) National state-owned operator which are no longer dominant on their domestic market with heavy 
competition from private foreign operators and the lack of a regulatory framework. 
Within the first three scenarios, Finger underlies the full liberalisation of the postal market and the 
implementation of a sufficient regulatory framework (e.g. definition of universal service, postal 
regulator). The first scenario doubtlessly describes DPWN, TNT, Royal Mail and LaPoste whose 
supremacies in the European postal market are beyond controversy among experts. In addition to 
Manner-Romberg and Dörrenbächer, Finger names two different scenarios for the smaller incumbents 
(the defenders) by assuming that one part will manage to reorganise successfully, form powerful 
cooperations, and can become profitable. The other part will have to be subsidised as they are not 
ready to face the new competition, they can not compensate the decline in mail volume, and their 
markets are too small to operate profitably after the fall of the monopoly. 
The fourth scenario can be applied to postal operators in developing countries (keyword: lack of 
regulatory framework) and is not relevant within our scope of European countries. 
5.1 Global Players 
Global players, often referred to as the “Big Four”, are historical postal operators which have been 
capable of taking advantage of liberalisation and have or are about to create a globally integrated 
postal network which they either own or significantly control, and this in all three market segments 
that are express, parcels, and increasingly also mail. This group is characterised by massive expansion 
strategies, both geographically and in product range. Postal companies pursuing this strategy follow 
their multinational customers and related trade flows and outsourced logistics. The strategy of the 
global integrator is to expand their coverage both horizontally and vertically to capture the market for 
so-called third party logistics and to act as a one-stop-shop for their industrial customers, whom they 
are following to markets abroad. DPWN, TNT and LaPoste have all communicated their intentions to 
lead the European postal consolidation process and have the cash flow to execute this strategy. 
Through consolidation and takeovers these incumbents will increase their market power even more, as 
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they already have large networks generating enough cash-flow to further increase their market shares. 
The concentration and consolidation of the market around two to four such global integrators will also 
mean that Europe will be serviced by a small number of relatively efficient postal operators that are 
able to use economies of scale. This will enable them to provide price-efficient services to their 
customers, as well as increase margins to secure a good return on the vast assets invested into the 
infrastructure. 
If we follow the four relevant factors which shaped the competition landscape (see chapter 4.1), we 
realise that those four incumbents could profit to a great extent from them: They all have a big home 
market which provides them with enough cash flow for investments in foreign markets and 
acquisitions. As far as TNT is concerned, they could not profit from a big home market, they took 
already at an early stage advantage of remailing profits and later of its early liberalised home market. 
All four incumbents used the asymmetric liberalisation as an instrument in the power play for markets 
to enter them at the earliest possible point in time. If a further differentiation should be done, we can 
describe DPWN and TNT as more aggressive and pro-active and LaPoste and Royal Mail as more 
conservative ones. Although the pace of reorganisation of the latter has been much more moderate, the 
general direction (at least with regard to internationalisation and diversification) is more or less the 
same. 
Interestingly, all of the big players have actually political problems in their home market. In Germany 
and England, the question of access regulation is reaching a climax. In addition, Royal Mail struggles 
to deliver the required delivery quality and DPWN has to face complaints concerning the 
cost/performance ratio. On the other side, the retention of the letter monopoly is currently discussed by 
the German parliament as well as labour unions and is very likely to be voted through. 
5.2 Specialised Players 
The other group, consisting of basically all the remaining and much smaller incumbents, shows a 
significant different competitive behaviour. Constrained by their budgets and their privatisation status, 
they have to face the massive consolidation process by the aggressive actors which puts heavy 
pressure on the defenders. They do not have the early-mover advantages and are now detecting the 
immense need for action. As a conclusion, Dörrenbächer (2003: 43) simply states: “All other (than the 
Big Four, editor’s note) European postal operators are either considered to be targets for future take-
overs or expected to form co-operations with other non- or weak-reorganisers”.  
But this does not mean that only the Big Four will by themselves dominate the global market. There 
will remain enough room for the other historical postal operators to position themselves, in particular 
if they have special competencies, be they geographical or commercial. The relative success of these 
specialised players will heavily depend upon financial and political constraints. Per definition, such 
specialised players will not have the financial clout to expand on a large scale, simply because they 
will not have a sufficiently big or sufficiently lucrative home market, or because they have liberalised 
relatively late and were not able to take advantage of the asymmetric competition. Others still may 
have legal or political constraints, whereby they may lack the political support for privatisation – as a 
pre-condition from raising money from the capital market – or simply be burdened by costly public 
service obligations. Their success will depend, on the following factors, namely to have particular high 
quality niche products, to successfully use the ICTs in their products, their processes, to be able to 
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resist and compete successfully with invading global integrators in their home market and perhaps 
region, and to be able to expand their business into neighbouring territories. 
5.3 Defensive Players 
Defensive players are small incumbents who have not managed, for several reasons, to transform 
themselves sufficiently rapidly and sufficiently profoundly so as to take advantage of the liberalising 
postal market. Consequently, these defensive players focus on their respective domestic markets and 
try to defend it as good as long as possible against the intrusion of both the global and the specialised 
players. Consequently, these posts are natural takeover targets and have to work out intelligent defence 
mechanisms to remain independent as well as profitable. 
5.4 Alliances and Cooperations  
Experts agree that a solo attempt of a smaller incumbent is a possible strategy but that profitability will 
be at stake as such incumbents face heavy market threats as soon as the monopolies will fall. More 
promising is the buildup of alliances and strategic cooperations. On the other hand, it may very well be 
that a global player views the costs of entering a market as being too high and decide to align itself 
with a defensive player. This will especially be the case in markets where traditional monopolies still 
persist and are unlikely to fall anytime soon (e.g. Siwtzerland). But it may also be worthwhile for a 
global player or specialised player to simply take a share in a small player. Such a strategic partnership 
gives the small player access to the global or at least regional network of the new partner company 
without having to build up these infrastructures on their own. The following section names a few 
existing alliances between European postal operators to demonstrate how (especially smaller) 
incumbents organise themselves to build up powerful networks and profit from economics of scale and 
scope. 
 
• La Poste 
- With Fedex, Correos (Spain), Italian Post and Sweden Post (was planned as a “south alliance” 
with Portugal and Greece, but could not be realised) 
- Several DPD franchisees belong to La Poste and another incumbent, so DPD Iberica (with 
Spanish Post) and DPD Scandinavia (with Swedish Post). 
• Posten AB (Sweden) 
- Franchise agreements with DPD (La Poste) in Sweden, Norway, Danmark, Finland, and 
Iceland 
- Cooperation with DPD in Poland and for the Baltic room 
- Pan Nordic Logistics (PNL, see below) 
• Swiss Post 
- Joint venture with TNT for international express 
- Joint Venture with GLS (subsidiary of Royal Mail) for international parcels 
• Spring 
- A joint venture between TNT (51%), Royal Mail and Singapore Post (24,5% each) for 
crossborder mail and value added services 
• Pan Nordic Logistics (PNL)  
- In 2000, Denmark Post, Sweden Post and Norway Post bundled their respective crossborder 
parcel businesses in a joint venture “Pan Nordic Logistics” (PNL). After the withdrawal of 
Sweden Post from the joint venture, an express operator in Sweden was aquired and 
cooperation agreements were entered with Finland Post, Estonia Post, Latvia Post and 
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Lithuania Post. PNL aims at keeping the Nordic countries in the business and at becoming 
itself the leading Nordic company in the express and parcels markets. 
• Baltic Express 
- Allows Estonia Post, Latvia Post and Lithuania Post to deliver parcels from door to door in the 
Baltic countries by using the delivery network of their partners. 
5.5 Offensive Moves 
In this section we focus on moves concerning the presence of incumbents in other European coun-tries 
and the share holding and/or cooperation between the operators. Moves on the level of the product and 
service portfolio will not be analysed, as this would go beyond our scope. 
5.5.1 Satisfaction with Current Position 
Experts (see Manner-Romberg, 2003: 33f.) rate the competitive situation in the European postal 
market as comparatively stable and do not expect offensive moves in the near future. As far as 
upcoming takeovers are concerned, they are not very likely as the Big Four have some integration 
tasks to do before they continue their acquisition courses. The strategies of DPWN and TNT envision 
a focus on the emerging markets in China and India. It is therefore assumed that they will concentrate 
their resource overthere and slow down their European activities. This could, in return, create 
opportunities for smaller incumbents. Most of them which will be targets for takeovers are not ready 
yet as the pain and pressure of the market liberalisation is not high enough. 
Nera (2004: 52f.) describes the current strategy of about half the EU member states as “cautious 
expansion” along the dimensions horizontal/vertical integration and internationalisation. Examples are 
Swedish Post, Post Denmark, Estonia Post, Latvia Post, Lithuania Post, Correos and Austrian Post. 
Most of them have some interests or operations abroad, but are generally quite satisified with their 
actual position. As a consequence, these incumbents are not expected to undertake bigger offensive 
moves in the near future. They are likely to pursue their strategies, focusing on niche markets (e.g. 
Austrian Post in Eastern Europe). 
Incumbents from smaller states (e.g. Belgium, Ireland and the Czech Republic) are generally 
consolidating their existing position (see Nera, 2004: 52f.): They do not significantly engage in the 
pan-European competition, but are trying to maintain or slightly improve their position in the home 
market. These incumbents strongly focus on the traditional mail business and offer only postal-related 
value added services like document management. It is to be expected that they will soon face heavy 
pressure as the gains from mail business will decline, no synergy potentials are available and new 
competitors will enter the market cherry-picking. 
5.5.2 Probable moves 
A complete new competitive situation would take place if two incumbents join forces as this would 
create a new big player. Naming possible incumbents would be too speculative. Within the group of 
the Big Four, Royal Mail (or at least its subsidiary GLS) would be an ideal target for TNT, as the 
British incumbent faces massive financial problems and could provide the necessary parcel ground 
network which lacks the Dutch incumbent who is specialised in express. Take-overs of smaller 
incumbents in other countries are expected to be made (if at all) by DPWN or TNT. However, the 
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attempts of both to buy shares of different incumbents (e.g. Danish or Austrian Post) were aborted due 
to political resistance. La Poste has a working parcel network (DPD) and an efficient cooperation with 
FedEx for its express business wherefore no immediate moves are expected. Royal Mail has problems 
in its home market to such an extent (recapitalisation, quality) that further internationalisation attempts 
or even acquisitions would probably not accepted by government, regulator and citizens. 
However, also smaller incumbents have merging plans. The Swedish post could play a key role in 
these developments. With the dedicated aim of becoming the leading postal operator in the 
Scandinavian and Baltic room but a comparatevely small home market without monopolies, it has not 
enough resources to achieve its goals on its own. It can therefore be expected that Posten AB will soon 
be looking for one or more strong partners. If they can hold up their independence or if Posten AB will 
become a premium target for takeovers is questionable, especially as the high quality and technology 
standard of this incumbent is very interesting. Post Danmark as another example lists in its “Strategy 
2006” the following objective: “Post Danmark is increasingly being exposed to competition from 
major international players in the postal and logistical markets. The most effective response to this 
development is to form an alliance with one of these players”. In June 2005, Post Danmark has sold 
22% stake to the British private-equity group CVC Capital Partners. In return, Post Danmark and CVC 
have teamed up acquire the share of up to 50 per cent minus 1 share in De Post-La Poste, the Belgian 
national postal operator. Especially the Scandinavian incumbents, as it seems, will be at the forefront 
of a new phase of mergers and acquisitions in the European postal market. 
As far as take-overs of competing private operators are concerned, no strategic offensives are pending. 
The larger and independent operators are not up for sale and the smaller ones do not suffice to unhinge 
the relative stable competitive configuration. Not to neglect, however, are moves by the two big US 
integrators FedEx and UPS: Both companies emphasise again and again that they have no intention to 
enter letter markets as this would require very high investments and probably heavy losses at the time 
of market entry. In the long run, however, we can not eliminate a possible cooperation with or even 
take-over of a medium-sized incumbent by one of the two integrators. FedEx already has a strong 
alliance with La Post, whereas UPS as the global market leader does not currently have such a link. 
Strategic relevance could be achieved by future cooperations in air transport: French Airposte 
(subsidiary of La Poste) for example has an agreement with Poste Italiane. TNT has the leading air 
transport network, closely followed by DPWN, FedEx and UPS. But as all the other European 
incumbents are too small to maintain own air transports, such cooperations could become a new 
crucial factor which determines the future configuration of the European postal market. 
5.5.3 Strength and seriousness of moves 
All of these strategic moves have to be considered as strong and serious (as soon as they are com-
pleted). Today’s relative equilibrium between the Big Four, the Specialised and the Defensive Player 
would be destabilised and the competitive landscape must be drawn anew. If we weight the respective 
seriousness with the probability of occurrence, the near future will keep ready only a few major 
moves. Most probable is the following scenario: A couple of operators (Big Four, but also Swedish or 
Danish Post) will continue their acquisition processes and purchase shares of smaller, but promising 
incumbents. From a European point of view, such a move is not a significant impact at any rate as it 
mainly affects the particular national market. However, if powerful networks are constructed by means 
of such share purchases, the assessment turns out different. Each incumbent teaming up with a larger 
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operator is furthermore a lost potential partner for other incumbents. As a consequence, the number of 
possible partner decreases and panic buying could set in. 
5.6 Defensive Capability 
We expect that most of the European incumbents will concentrate their resources on skimming their 
protected markets and preparing themselves for the full liberalisation in order to defend a (hostile) 
takeover by a large operator. At the moment, the possibilities of smaller incumbents to defend 
themselves against these afore said moves have to be assessed positive. Due to their monopolies and 
the governmental ownership, the incumbents have big influence on how much competition is 
admitted, either in terms of the market entry of another operator or an attempted share holding. With 
the focus opened to the looming liberalisation, the defensive capabilities of smaller incumbents seem 
to be questionable. As analysed above, the ability to resist and compete successfully with invading 
global integrators in their home market will become the deciding factor on the way to become a 
“specialised player” rather then a “defensive player”. Their success will depend, we think, on the 
following factors, namely to have particular high quality niche products, to successfully use the ICTs 
in their products, their processes, and their own management, and to be able to expand their business 
into neighbouring territories. In conclusion one can say that such specialised players can be expected 
to fulfill their role very well and they will probably be highly competitive in their respective markets, 
though clearly they will not be able to compete on a global scale. 
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